We study a signaling game between two firms competing to have their product chosen by a principal. The products have (real-valued) qualities, which are drawn i.i.d. from a common prior. The principal aims to choose the better of the two products, but …
We study the limits of an information intermediary in Bayesian auctions. Formally, we consider the standard single-item auction, with a revenue-maximizing seller and n buyers with independent private values; in addition, we now have an intermediary …
We study the use of Bayesian persuasion (i.e., strategic use of information disclosure/signaling) in endogenous team formation. This is an important consideration in settings such as crowdsourcing competitions, open science challenges and group-based …
Recent increase in online privacy concerns prompts the following question: can a recommender system be accurate if users do not entrust it with their private data? To answer this, we study the problem of learning item-clusters under local …
An essential primitive for an efficient research ecosystem is *partial-progress sharing* (PPS) - whereby a researcher shares information immediately upon making a breakthrough. This helps prevent duplication of work; however there is evidence that …
Recent increase in online privacy concerns prompts the following question: can a recommender system be accurate if users do not entrust it with their private data? To answer this, we study the problem of learning item-clusters under local …