FALL 2007

ORIE 629
MWF 10:10-11 Upson 215
Professor Eric Friedman , 222 Rhodes Hall, 255-9130

About the course   (Previous offerings: Spring05)

Syllabus

Problem sets
PS 1     (solutions)
PS 2     (solutions, timed solutions)
PS 3     (solutions, timed solutions)
PS 4     (solutions, timed solutions)
PS 5     (solutions, timed solutions)





References from Lectures
Weeks 1 and 2:   

• T. Roughgarden, The Price of Anarchy is Independent of the Network Topology,
• T. Roughgarden, Designing Networks for Selfish Users is Hard
• T. Roughgarden and E. Tardos, How Bad is Selfish Routing?,  
• Friedman:  A Generic Analysis of Selfish Routing

Week 3:

• Papadimitriou,  Computing correlated equilibria in multiplayer games.
• Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou,  The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
• Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou,  Three-Player Games Are Hard
• Andy McLennan, The Expected Number of Nash Equilibria of a Normal Form Game

Weeks 4 and 5:

• Monderer and Shapley: Potential games
• Anshelevich,  Dasgupta, Kleinberg, Tardos,  Wexler, and  Roughgarden: The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation,
• Milgrom and Roberts: Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Friedman and Landsberg: Dynamical Effects of Partial Orderings in Physical Systems
  

Weeks 10 -12:

• D. Koller, N. Megiddo, and B. von Stengel (1994). "Fast Algorithms for Finding Randomized Strategies in Game Trees." Proceedings of the 26th ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC '94)
• Surreal Numbers -- wikipedia
• Nimbers -- wikipedia
• Some Notes on Combinatorial Game Theory
• Chomp, Recurrences, and Chaos By Doron Zeilberger
• On the Geometry of Combinatorial Games: A renormalization approach, with A. Landsberg.  Games of No Chance III (tentative title), edited by R. Nowakowski (Forthcoming 2007).

Weeks 13-15

• Matt Jackson,  A Crash Course in Implementation Theory
  
• Roger B. Myerson, Optimal Auction Design
  
• Jacques Cremer, Richard P. McLean, Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions